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I. INTRODUCTION
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.1 the United
States Supreme Court issued its latest opinion interpreting the reach of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' The
H.J. Inc. decision comes at a time when the RICO statute is at the
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice. B.S.,
United States Merchant Marine Academy, 1967; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1973. The Au-
thor also is former United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The efforts of
the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice in the development
and drafting of this Article are gratefully acknowledged.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989). In H.J. Inc. the Court held that a RICO "pattern of racketeering
activity" must consist of racketeering acts that are related and that pose a threat of continuing
racketeering activity. Id. at 2901. However, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's requirement
that the pattern consist of multiple "schemes." Id. at 2906; see also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988)).
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center of controversy. Those opposed to private treble damages suits
particularly attack the statute. The defense bar attacks the use of the
statute in white-collar prosecutions, especially in those cases involving
securities fraud. If the defense bar has its way in Congress, RICO could
not be invoked in cases involving fraud alone. The criminal defense bar
also has criticized the pretrial restraining orders and subsequent forfeit-
ures that have been ordered by the courts in several high-profile RICO
cases.
The Department of Justice, the agency primarily responsible for
bringing RICO actions on behalf of the Federal Government, must for-
mulate a reasonable plan for the development of RICO. RICO has
proven to be the Department's most effective tool against organized
crime and other serious criminal activity, and the flexibility it gives
prosecutors must be retained. At the same time, we must concede the
legitimate concerns of the private bar, the public, and, of course, the
Supreme Court, that RICO, like any statute, is subject to abuse.
Most current efforts at legislative reform of RICO have been
designed to curb alleged abuses by private plaintiffs. Nevertheless, we
continue to fear that our use of RICO will be unfairly lumped together
with the many private RICO suits that have created calls for reform. If
we let this brush tar our image, Congress might curtail needlessly the
criminal provisions of this most important statute. Our best defense is
our record. It is important, therefore, to review the evolution and suc-
cess of criminal RICO prosecutions.
II. EVOLUTION OF RICO PROSECUTIONS AND AUTHORIZATION
PROCEDURES
In 1981, eleven years after RICO was enacted, federal RICO prose-
cutions, while not rare, were not yet commonplace. Perhaps thirty a
year, or fewer, were filed during the statute's first decade. By today's
standards, most of these prosecutions were of modest proportion, usu-
ally alleging the commission of traditional organized crime offenses like
extortion, gambling, or labor racketeering.4 Civil RICO cases virtually
3. See, e.g., S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(bills pending in the 101st Congress that would limit recovery of treble damages to government
plaintiffs or private plaintiffs where the defendant previously has been convicted of related con-
duct); S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 4923, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (bills in the
100th Congress using the prior-conviction approach to limit recovery of treble damages); H.R.
4920, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (bill in the 100th Congress that sharply would restrict govern-
ment equitable suits involving labor unions, and that would restrict private actions by subject
matter); H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (bill introduced in 1985 adopting the prior-convic-
tion approach).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916
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did not exist.
The quiescence of the RICO statute during its first decade did not
predict the statute's second decade. In 1983 and 1984 an explosion of
RICO cases occurred that is still being felt. In part, this explosion was
ignited by the United States v. Turkette5 and Russello v. United
States' decisions. In Turkette the Supreme Court held that a RICO
"enterprise" can be a wholly illegitimate group, such as an organized
crime family.7 Russello held that the proceeds of racketeering activity
are subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. section 1963(a)(1).' In combi-
nation these decisions opened the door to "association-in-fact" prosecu-
tions seeking broad forfeitures from business and labor interests. Soon
after Turkette and Russello were decided, several major RICO prosecu-
tions of organized crime factions in New York City reached the indict-
ment stage, accompanied by enormous media coverage.' This coverage
spurred FBI offices and federal prosecutors throughout the country to
increase significantly the number of RICO investigations and to acceler-
ate the completion of RICO cases already initiated. By 1989 the steady
flow of organized crime RICO prosecutions had resulted in the convic-
tions of a number of organized crime figures: the bosses of the major
New York La Cosa Nostra families in the "Commission" case; 10 numer-
ous participants in a massive Sicilian heroin importation ring (the
"Pizza Connection" case);" and mob bosses in Los Angeles,' 2 Cleve-
land, 13 Kansas City,14 Philadelphia," Boston," and Newark.'1 Several
of these defendants received prison sentences of one hundred years.' 8
As we gained experience through the organized crime cases, we in-
creased the use of RICO in other categories. In Chicago, for example,
Operation GREYLORD has produced a spectacular string of successful
(1981); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976).
5. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
6. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
7. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81.
8. Russello, 464 U.S. at 16, 22.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3192
(1989); United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1995 (1988);
United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
10. See Salerno, 868 F.2d at 524.
11. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989).
12. See United States v. Milano, No. 87-439 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
13. See United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
14. See United States v. Civella, No. 84-32-5 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
15. See United States v. Scarfo, 711 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
16. See United States v. Angiulo, No. 83-235-N (D. Mass. 1983).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071
(1982).
18. See, e.g., Salerno, 868 F.2d at 524.
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RICO prosecutions of corrupt judges and associated persons.19 After
five years, those cases are still being prosecuted. Other RICO prosecu-
tions have attacked every variety of public corruption at the state, local,
and federal levels.20 RICO has been used against violent motorcycle
gangs such as the Pagans and the Outlaw Motorcycle Club.21 In Seattle,
RICO was used to prosecute members of the "Order," a neo-Nazi ter-
rorist group that furthered its extremist views through murder and
armed robbery.2 2 There have been scores of successful RICO prosecu-
tions of narcotics rings, including major South American traffickers
such as Carlos Lehder.2 3 Other major figures, such as former Panama-
nian General Manuel Noriega, are under indictment. More recently,
RICO has been applied to extensive white-collar criminality, including
insider-trading of securities24 and bank failures caused by criminal
fraud.25
Finally, although used far less frequently than the criminal provi-
sions, the civil RICO provisions have proven their worth in several gov-
ernment actions, including the recently settled suit in the Southern
District of New York that sought to remove a long-standing criminal
influence from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 8
Thus, as private civil RICO cases have mushroomed,2 7 the govern-
ment's uses of criminal and, to some extent, civil RICO has also ex-
panded. However, in contrast to private RICO cases, all government
actions were and are subject to strict internal review and controls. In
1981 the Criminal Division established a system whereby every pro-
posed RICO action by the government, criminal or civil, is submitted to
the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section for review and ap-
proval.28 The Section substantially modifies most of these cases before
the charges are filed. As a result of this review process, very few of our
19. See, e.g., United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. De-
vine, 787 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986); United States v. Conn, 769 F.2d
420 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1012 (1986).
20. See, e.g., LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 977 (Cook County, Ill., judge); see also United States v.
Dozier, 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982) (state official); United States v.
Aguilar, No. CR 89-364 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (indictment filed) (federal judge).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1018 (1987); United States v. Nolan, No. 86-6122-Cr-ZLOCH (S.D. Fla. 1986).
22. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 171 (1988).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 669 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, No. 88-CR-645 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (indictment filed).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Billman, No. B-89-0466 (D. Md. 1989) (indictment filed).
26. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (DNE) (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (settled in Mar. 1989).
27. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
28. CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (1989) [herein-
after U.S.A.M.].
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RICO prosecutions have failed because of defects in the pleadings or in
legal justification. 9 As a further result of our approval procedure, there
has been, until recently, very little criticism of the government's use of
RICO. The lack of any such controls over private civil actions, however,
arguably has caused the controversy surrounding the private use of
RICO to have a negative spill-over effect onto the governmental actions.
III. THE CIVIL RICO CONTROVERSY AND PROPOSED REFORM
LEGISLATION
The Department has used RICO aggressively over the past ten
years, but has protected RICO from attack by carefully controlling its
use. During this same period, the private civil RICO controversy has
grown out of control.3 0 I agree with many RICO reformists that a num-
ber of these private actions were well outside the scope of the original
congressional intent.3 1 As the government helplessly watched the vol-
ume of civil RICO filings increase, the federal courts have reacted by
reinterpreting RICO more narrowly despite Congress's specific require-
ment that RICO be "liberally construed. 3 2 For example, the Second
Circuit held that a RICO plaintiff must demonstrate both that the de-
fendant had been convicted previously of at least one of the acts of
racketeering alleged in the RICO complaint or of a RICO violation and
that the plaintiff had suffered a "racketeering injury" from the RICO
violation apart from any injury caused by the underlying criminal
acts.33 These judicially imposed requirements were rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.3 4 and American Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc. 5
The Sedima decision demonstrates how the civil RICO controversy
has affected governmental use of RICO. In Sedima the Supreme Court
suggested that a "pattern of racketeering activity" must exhibit "con-
tinuity plus relationship. 3'6 Because a "pattern of racketeering activity"
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, we have
29. The Department has approved some 800 cases. Of those, fewer than 2% purportedly con-
tained legal defects.
30. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REv.
827 (1987); Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 55; Lacovara & Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Runaway
Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1985); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick,
Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Marconi v. White Sox, No. 83-C-7015 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1986) (alleging that
baseball stadium guards confiscated tickets plaintiff was attempting to sell).
32. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
33. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
34. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
35. 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
36. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
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struggled with these terms ever since. Because we have applied our sin-
gle-episode rule, 7 our RICO indictments have survived attack even in
those courts construing narrowly the term "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity." In 1987, however, the Eighth Circuit held in a civil RICO case
that the Government had to establish the existence of multiple
schemes, not simply multiple acts of criminal conduct.3 s Such a restric-
tive definition of pattern virtually halted criminal prosecutions in that
circuit. Fortunately, the Supreme Court eventually reversed the
decision."'
Even though the Court has rejected restrictive interpretations of
the RICO statute, the continued appearance of RICO cases in the Su-
preme Court has had consequences extending far beyond the legal is-
sues presented in those individual cases. Most significantly, many in
Congress have viewed the Sedima and H.J. Inc. decisions as judicial
S.O.S. signals. In response to these signals, members of Congress have
proposed a series of bills that would change greatly the face and reach
of the entire RICO statutory scheme.
Recently, a flood of RICO "reform" legislation has been proposed. 0
These reform measures have ranged from proposals to increase drasti-
cally the number of RICO predicates to proposals that would curtail
RICO actions so that only criminal cases could be brought, and only for
a reduced number of predicates. Some of the proposals have been daz-
zling in their complexity and confusion.41
Our response to RICO "reform" bills has evolved over the years. At
first, we felt that the abuse of private civil RICO was insufficient to
warrant substantial amendments. 2 Today, we believe the increased
abuse in private civil RICO threatens government use of RICO; there-
fore, some restrictions on private actions are called for. In public testi-
mony, we have indicated that if it becomes impossible to reach a
consensus with respect to lesser reforms, Congress should consider seri-
ously the abolition of private RICO actions.43 Whether the situation has
37. United States Attorneys' Manual provides: "No indictment shall be brought charging a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) based upon a pattern of racketeering activity growing out of a
single criminal episode or transaction." U.SAM., supra note 28, § 9-110.340.
38. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct.
2893 (1989).
39. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2893.
40. See supra note 3.
41. See, e.g., S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S1653 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989),
which would replace the one short paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988) with a 91/2-page version of
the subsection, including designations such as 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(2)(B)(iii)(II) (1988).
42. See RICO Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. & 2d Sess. 333 (1985) (statement of John C.
Keeney).
43. See Hearings on S. 438 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
[Vol. 43:651656
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become that extreme, however, remains to be seen.
Let me summarize our position with respect to RICO reform legis-
lation at this time. Since May 1985 the Department has testified on
several occasions before House and Senate committees that were con-
sidering proposals to narrow the private civil provisions of RICO." De-
pending on the extent of the reform contained in the particular bill
under consideration, the Department has:
1. endorsed the retention of the term "racketeering" for govern-
ment RICO actions;
2. recommended that the United States be designated a "person"
under section 1964(c) and thus qualify for treble damages whether or
not the defendant has been convicted previously of RICO or of a predi-
cate act;
3. opposed creation of affirmative defenses in a government civil
RICO action allowing the defendant to assert that the "criminal" acts
were committed in reliance on a state or federal regulatory ruling;
4. opposed retroactive application of RICO reform legislation;
5. sought to specify that the government's burden of proof in a civil
RICO suit be a preponderance of the evidence;
6. opposed efforts to dilute the strength of sections 1962, 1963, and
1964(a); 5
7. conceded that private civil RICO suits under section 1964(c)
should be curtailed, possibly by enactment of a prior-conviction re-
quirement, 6 or abolished; and,
8. opposed the complicated formulas proposed in recent bills that
create special categories of plaintiffs or injury through which actual, pu-
nitive, or treble damages become available.
IV. CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING GOVERNMENTAL USE OF RICO
A. Pretrial Restraining Orders
The Department's use of temporary restraining orders (TROs) to
prevent the dissipation of assets subject to forfeiture prior to the con-
clusion of a criminal RICO trial has engendered deep criticism. Under
18 U.S.C. section 1963(d), the United States may move for the entry of
Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) [hereinafter S. 438 Hearings] (hearings not officially printed as of current
date) (testimony of John C. Keeney).
44. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) (describing the prohibited activities under the statute); id. §
1963 (setting forth criminal penalties for violations); id. § 1964(a) (granting jurisdiction to United
States district courts to impose civil remedies for violations).
46. Such a provision would require that a defendant have been convicted of RICO or a RICO
predicate offense as a prerequisite to recovery of treble damages by the plaintiff.
1990]
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such an order upon the filing of a RICO indictment.47 Although the
statute does not expressly require an adversarial hearing on the motion,
most courts have decided that some sort of adversarial hearing is neces-
sary to ensure due process to the person whose assets are to be re-
strained.48 The Criminal Division instructs its prosecutors to consent to
a defendant's request, if reasonable, for an adversarial hearing to deter-
mine whether a TRO is appropriate in a particular case. However, de-
spite the fact that pretrial restraints have been a feature of RICO since
its inception, and even the subject of litigation as long ago as 1975,"'
RICO-TROs are hotly debated, perhaps because of public reaction to
the Princeton/Newport case.5 0
Princeton/Newport Partners (PNP) was a New Jersey investment
partnership that conducted substantial stock and bond trading in the
1980s with Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel). Five PNP officers (and a
Drexel officer) were indicted in the Southern District of New York on
August 4, 1988, for RICO and other charges involving securities and
related violations as well as tax fraud conspiracy. The United States
Attorney moved the same day for a TRO to prohibit each defendant
from liquidating his interests in PNP. The prosecution also sought to
restrain PNP itself from liquidating its assets even though PNP was
not a defendant. After modifying the government's request, the court
entered the TRO but agreed to withhold distribution of the TRO to
PNP's customers while PNP appealed to the Second Circuit. 1
In the Second Circuit the defendants argued that the restraining
order was improper because it sought to place restraints on an
unindicted third party in order to secure a potential RICO forfeiture.
The Second Circuit disagreed, ruling that section 1963(d)(1)(A) clearly
authorizes a court to "'take any other action. . . to preserve the avail-
ability of. . . property'" subject to forfeiture.52 However, the court di-
rected the district court to explore alternative methods of securing the
forfeiture, such as the posting of a performance bond.53 On remand, the
47. See id. § 1963(d)(1)(B). Under § 1963(d)(1)(B), the government also may move for a
preindictment TRO in certain extraordinary circumstances. Id. This provision is rarely used.
48. The Supreme Court recently declined to decide whether a hearing is required or, if so,
how extensive the hearing must be. See United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 n.10
(1989). Some circuits clearly require a hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. Mus-
son, 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that an indictment supplies sufficient probable cause to
justify a TRO).
49. See United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed, 556
F.2d 569 (3d Cir.), mandamus granted, 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977).
50. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
51. Id. at 117-18.
52. Id. at 119 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1) (1988)).
53. Id. at 121-22.
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government claimed that the amount to be secured was the maximum
potential forfeiture, meaning the maximum value of each defendant's
interest in PNP during the period covered by the indictment. The de-
fendants sought to limit forfeiture to the amount of their capital ac-
counts as of the date of the indictment."
The district court ruled that the government could restrain the as-
sets of unindicted third parties if the restraint was necessary to pre-
serve the potential forfeiture. According to the court, "The Government
has the right to preserve property that might be tainted, even if it in-
volves the property of third, fourth and fifth parties. '5
At a hearing to determine the amount of the potential forfeiture
that had to be secured, the prosecutors requested twenty-four million
dollars, the maximum amount of the defendants' interest in PNP dur-
ing the alleged racketeering activity and up to the date of the indict-
ment. Judge Carter limited the amount to fourteen million dollars,
which represented the maximum amount of the defendants' interests
only during the period of the racketeering activity, along with interest
accrued in that time. 6 As a result of this ruling, Princeton/Newport
was able to post a bond, and there was no need for a restraining order
against the firm.
After Princeton/Newport posted the bond, the dispute worsened.
Defense attorneys claimed that the threat of a superseding indictment,
which prosecutors originally had announced for November 1988, but
then postponed until January 1989, ultimately led to the announcement
of PNP's liquidation on December 7, 1988.5
The pretrial announcement of PNP's liquidation angered the busi-
ness media, especially the Wall Street Journal.5s Whatever the facts
behind the announced liquidation may have been-and there is consid-
erable dispute about the facts-we recognize the continuing perception
that the RICO TRO contributed to PNP's liquidation before the de-
fendants had a chance to defend themselves at trial.5 9 The Department
54. United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
55. United States v. Regan, No. 88 Cr 517 (RLC) (Order dated Oct. 4, 1988).
56. United States v. Regan, No. 88 Cr 517 (RLC) (Order dated Oct. 21, 1988).
57. The defendants asserted that investors in the PNP partnerships were allowed to with-
draw capital only once a year, on Nov. 19. In response to the government's plans for a superseding
indictment, the withdrawal date was moved back to Dec. 10, 1988, so that the investors could
consider the impact of the final indictment prior to making their investment decisions. When the
government pushed back the date of the superseding indictment, the investors purportedly were
unable to assess the impact of the final indictment, and the liquidation was announced.
58. See, e.g., Adler, Heated Argument: Are RICO Seizures a Violation of Rights, As Critics
Contend, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
59. Much of the press criticism has been unjustified and uninformed. Because the PNP case
is proceeding to appeal, it would be inappropriate to discuss the facts in detail. It is a matter of
public record, however, that at trial the defendants were convicted of 63 of the 64 counts alleged in
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believes its use of TROs has been justified generally and that it must
continue to seek TROs in appropriate circumstances. We recognize,
however, that we risk adverse RICO legislation if a perception continues
that we needlessly are seeking pretrial restraints of assets.
As a precaution, the Department's RICO approval guidelines60 were
modified in June 1989 to provide:
1. As part of the approval process for RICO prosecutions, the prosecutor must sub-
mit any proposed forfeiture TRO for review by the Organized Crime and Racke-
teering Section. The prosecutor must show that less-intrusive remedies (such as
bonds) are not likely to preserve the assets for forfeiture in the event of a
conviction.
2. In seeking approval of a TRO, the prosecutor must articulate any anticipated
impact that forfeiture and the TRO would have on innocent third parties, balanced
against the government's need to preserve the assets.
3. In deciding whether forfeiture (and, hence, a TRO) is appropriate, the Section
will consider the nature and severity of the offense; the government's policy is not
to seek the fullest forfeiture permissible under the law where that forfeiture would
be disproportionate to the defendant's crime.
4. When a RICO TRO is being sought, the prosecutor is required, at the earliest
appropriate time, to state publicly that the government's request for a TRO, and
eventual forfeiture, is made in full recognition of the rights of third parties-that
is, in requesting the TRO, the government will not seek to disrupt the normal,
legitimate business activities of the defendant; will not seek through use of the
relation-back doctrine to take from third parties assets legitimately transferred to
them; will not seek to vitiate legitimate business transactions occurring between the
defendant and third parties; and will, in all other respects, assist the court in ensur-
ing that the rights of third parties are protected, through proceedings under 18
U.S.C. Section 1963(l) and otherwise.
I believe the letter and spirit of these provisions will restrict TROs
within acceptable boundaries.
B. Forfeiture
For much of the 1980s, the controversies surrounding RICO fo-
cused on its applicability to certain classes of defendants such as infor-
mally organized "enterprises" and on the meaning of "pattern of
racketeering activity." While the latter issue remains controversial, the
the indictment.
The Princeton/Newport defendants were sentenced on Nov. 6, 1989; they received sentences
ranging from three to six months. United States v. Regan, No. 88 Cr 517 (RLC) (Order dated Nov.
6, 1989). On the issue of forfeiture, Judge Carter apparently agreed with the government's position
that § 1963(a)(2) requires full forfeiture of the defendants' enterprise interests, because he ordered
Charles Zarzecki, who was involved in stock manipulation, to forfeit the $1.38 million that the
government had requested, rather than the $200,000 that the jury had directed. However, while
the government's position was vindicated in this respect, Judge Carter dismissed the forfeitures
against the four defendants who were convicted only of tax-parking charges, on the ground that
"the benefits the defendants received were greatly disproportionate to the penalty," in violation of
the eighth amendment. Id.
60. U.S.A.M., supra note 28, § 9-110.414.
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public has become accustomed-and gratifyingly so-to the sight of
mob bosses in handcuffs being led off to prison to serve fifty year
sentences. In the criminal area, RICO works. As a result, the debate has
been narrowed considerably to the penalties imposed on white-collar
RICO defendants.
Except when convicted under RICO,"' defendants convicted of fed-
eral white-collar offenses generally face a prison sentence (which nor-
mally is limited to five years), a fine (perhaps as much as one million
dollars, but normally no more than a maximum of 250,000 dollars), and
restitution to the victims.62 Such defendants, in fact, may spend only a
short period in jail.6 s All too often, according to a recent article in the
Washington Post,6 4 the fine goes unpaid. Of course, the victims may sue
such defendants civilly in state or federal court for compensatory and
punitive damages.
RICO, however, operates more broadly. First, RICO requires con-
victed defendants to forfeit all of their gross criminal proceeds, if such
forfeiture is sought.65 Second, if the defendants have business assets or
interests that were specifically acquired or maintained through their
criminal acts, those interests will be forfeited as well.6
The problem-if it is a problem-is that RICO also requires the
convicted defendants to forfeit their entire interest in any business (the
61. Recent legislation in the wake of the savings and loan crisis has increased dramatically
the penalties for some other white-collar violations. For example, the maximum penalty for violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. §§ 215(a), 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1344 (1988), has been increased to a $1
million fine and 20 years in prison. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 961, 103 Stat. 183, 499-500 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
62. On Aug. 9, 1989, the penalties for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 (1988),
and other statutes were increased to a maximum of a $1,000,000 fine and 20 years in prison. In
addition, both criminal and civil forfeitures are now available for these and other offenses affecting
financial institutions. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
supra note 61, § 961, 103 Stat. at 500 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1344).
63. Under the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated in 1987 pursuant to the Sentencing Re-
form Act (SRA) of 1984, see Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), sentences in white-collar fraud
cases are dependent largely upon the amount of the financial loss in the case. FEDERALSENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (West 1990). The base offense level for a fraud offense with a loss of
$2000 or less is six, which translates into a sentencing range of between zero and six months for a
first-time offender. A fraud offense with a loss between $1,500,000 and $2,500,000 would result in a
twelve-level increase in the base offense level to level 18 (27-33 months). The minimum base of-
fense level for a RICO violation is level 19 (30-37 months). See id. § 2El.1. It should be pointed
out that, because the SRA abolished the parole system, sentences under the SRA are "real time"
sentences that can be shortened only by a maximum of 54 days per year for good behavior. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
64. Torry, Unpaid Federal Fines Drift into Oblivion, Disorganization, Wash. Post, Sept. 18,
1989, at Al, col. 5.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1988).
66. See id. § 1963(a)(1).
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"enterprise") that is used in some way to facilitate the RICO offense. 7
The rationale is unassailable: Congress wanted racketeers completely
removed from businesses that they had infiltrated. Many white-collar
RICO defendants, however, do not fit the traditional mold of organized
crime figures.68 Even when business people commit a series of frauds,
for example, it is difficult in most cases to characterize their activity as
criminal "infiltration." Thus, the potential that a business person con-
victed of RICO could forfeit an entire business has angered RICO crit-
ics. This concern with proportionality is legitimate.
Before turning to several court decisions concerning the propor-
tionality of RICO forfeitures, however, I want to make two important
preliminary points. First, in recognition of the importance of tailoring
forfeiture to the severity of the defendant's crimes, the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division carefully
screens every proposed forfeiture, especially those under section
1963(a)(2), to ensure fairness. Certainly we take an aggressive approach
to RICO violations; to do less would be to fail in our responsibilities.
But we also curtail many proposed forfeitures."
Second, our critics often forget that before a forfeiture actually oc-
curs, a judge must pass upon its legal sufficiency and a fact-finder, usu-
ally the jury, upon its factual merits. One would think from the heat
generated by RICO forfeitures that the government is allowed to forfeit
assets unilaterally. That is neither the law nor the reality.
Section 1963(a)(2), read and applied literally, requires full forfei-
ture of the defendant's enterprise interest, even when the degree of the
defendant's crimes may seem minor in comparison to the extent of the
forfeiture. The eighth amendment's protection against disproportionate
punishment, however, remains as a bar to indiscriminate use of the for-
feiture provision. In United States v. L'Hoste" the jury convicted the
defendant of RICO violations and held his total business interests to be
forfeitable. The trial court refused to enter such an order because some
67. See id. § 1963(a)(2). It should be emphasized that such RICO forfeiture is mandatory
only if alleged in the indictment and endorsed by the jury. RICO forfeiture may be mandatory, but
it is not automatic from the fact of conviction.
68. Some of RICO's critics have argued that because RICO was enacted in order to address
the problem of infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime, it should be limited in its
application to that class of defendants. Such a limitation, however, would be unworkable and,
almost certainly, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decisively put this argument to rest in H.J.
Inc., adopting the view that" '[i]t is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of
the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly committed
by persons outside organized crime as well.'" H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct.
2893, 2905 (1989) (quoting Sen. John L. McClellan, 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970)).
69. The screening process is much more extensive than the public record indicates because
that record reflects only those forfeitures sought in cases actually indicted.
70. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 883 (1980).
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of the defendant's property was held jointly with his wife.7 On a writ of
mandamus, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court lacked the power
to withhold forfeiture.72 In contrast, the Second Circuit had already
held that in some circumstances, to avoid unconstitutional results, a
court must tailor RICO forfeiture to be commensurate with the crimes
involved, especially when the defendant's enterprise contained both le-
gitimate and illegitimate aspects. 73
Three recent cases, United States v. Busher,74 United States v.
Horak,75 and United States v. Porcelli,76 have dealt with the propor-
tionality of RICO forfeitures. 7 In Busher the defendant's business han-
dled fourteen Department of Defense contracts, only three of which
were connected to his acts of racketeering. 78 The Ninth Circuit held
that despite RICO's apparent breadth, the district court, in considering
forfeiture, must take into account the severity of the defendant's con-
duct, the degree to which his conduct "infected" his business, his state
of mind, and whether his business was essentially legitimate.79 In short,
in the Ninth Circuit, RICO forfeiture must be proportionate to survive
an eighth amendment attack.
In Horak the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion. The
Horak defendant's interests in the enterprise-in this case a parent cor-
poration and one of its subsidiaries-covered more than the alleged
criminal acts. 0 With respect to the particular entity through which
Horak bribed city officials for contracts, the Seventh Circuit stated it
would have little trouble upholding forfeiture of any interests (job, sal-
ary, bonuses, and pension) that Horak acquired or maintained through
his criminal acts in violation of section 1963(a)(1).81 But the circuit
court declined to overrule the district court's denial of forfeiture of the
stock that Horak acquired in the parent corporation before he commit-
ted his crimes.82
The Porcelli case involved a defendant who used interlocking cor-
porations to cheat New York State out of 4.7 million dollars in gasoline
71. Id. at 809-10.
72. Id. at 813.
73. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
74. 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. 833 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1987).
76. 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989).
77. Cf. United States v. Angiulo, Nos. 86-1331, 89-1212, 89-1800 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 1990).
78. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414.
79. Id. at 1415-16.
80. Horak, 833 F.2d at 1241-42.
81. Id. at 1243.
82. Id. at 1251. It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit found the district court's ruling
to be nonappealable; its holding, thus, was in the context of a request for a writ of mandamus.
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sales taxes.8 3 The Porcelli case is difficult to analyze in the forfeiture
context because, on at least two occasions, the court confused the de-
fendant and his interests with the enterprise itself."4 Consequently, at
one point the court appeared to hold that a defendant never forfeits an
interest under RICO unless that interest is tainted by the defendant's
unlawful acts, 5 whereas at a different point the court stated that "a
RICO enterprise [sic] found in violation of Section 1962(c) is indivisible
and is forfeitable in its entirety. 8 6 Nonetheless, the court's message to
the government was clear: (1) If the government alleges that the de-
fendant operated ten companies as an "enterprise" in violation of RICO
and the proof demonstrates that only six companies were connected to
the predicate crimes, forfeiture will be confined to the defendant's in-
terests in the six; and (2) To the extent that subsection 1963(a)(2) can
be construed to require total forfeiture of a defendant's interest in a
business, regardless of the extent to which that interest is connected to
illegal acts, the eighth amendment's protection against disproportionate
punishment applies.8
Applying these two concepts, the Second Circuit, again contribut-
ing to the confusion, held that "Porcelli must forfeit his RICO enter-
prise."8' 8 However, unlike the indictment, the court defined Porcelli's
enterprise as excluding four companies to which illegality could not be
connected. 9
These cases have had an impact on how the Department of Justice
analyzes RICO forfeiture proposals. The clearest message from these
cases is that courts do not want, and will go out of their way to prevent,
disproportionate forfeitures, 90 either by narrowing the affected "enter-
prise" alleged in a particular case or by applying the eighth amendment
as a check against RICO's liberal construction clause. In one sense, the
courts are the answer to those critics who say that section 1963(a)(2)
forfeitures are unconstitutional and the source of unfair threats of pros-
83. Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1357.
84. See id. at 1364.
85. See id. at 1365. This is actually the "but for" test articulated by the Seventh Circuit in
Horak for "(a)(1)" interests, i.e., those interests "acquired and maintained" in violation of RICO.
See Horak, 833 F.2d at 1243.
86. Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1364.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1365 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 1365.
90. This situation is akin to the restrictions that the courts have imposed on RICO's "pat-
tern" element, discussed below, in order to weed out technically sufficient but substantively poor
civil RICO cases. The forfeiture restrictions, however, result from constitutional limitations, unlike
the "pattern" restrictions, which result from statutory interpretation. For a discussion of the re-
duction of the forfeitures in the Princeton/Newport case under eighth amendment principles, see
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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ecution. But the Department of Justice also must prevent requests for
excessive forfeitures from ever reaching the courts. When courts are
faced with excessive forfeiture requests, they are given the opportunity
to suggest that RICO is unconstitutional on its face instead of merely
ruling on its application. Such broad criticisms invite congressional
tinkering to our detriment. Consequently, the Criminal Division does
not authorize extreme RICO forfeiture requests even if they technically
satisfy the requirements of section 1963(a)(2).
V. RICO's "PATTERN" ELEMENT
A. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
The most recent RICO controversy developed on June 26, 1989,
when the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in the H.J.
Inc."1 case. The Court's opinion was not particularly controversial. The
Court unanimously struck down the Eighth Circuit's notorious "multi-
ple schemes" test, which required not only that a RICO "pattern of
racketeering activity" consist of multiple acts of racketeering activity,
but that the pattern comprise multiple "schemes." 92 The Eighth Cir-
cuit's test was so restrictive that it would have excluded from the reach
of RICO many appropriate civil suits and prosecutions.
The Court's failure to explain clearly what "pattern of racketeering
activity" does mean, given that it does not require multiple schemes,
surprised some observers. The Court, expanding somewhat on its earlier
suggestions in the Sedima case with respect to the requirements of
"continuity" and "relationship, 9 3 adopted the definition of "pattern"
from the repealed Dangerous Special Offender statute94 to define the
"relationship" concept.95 This aspect of the Court's opinion is not par-
ticularly noteworthy; no RICO cases brought by the government have
failed because of a lack of relationship among the acts in the pattern. In
fact, each of the three substantive RICO offenses96 requires a specific
nexus between the racketeering acts and the enterprise. Therefore,
RICO already has a built-in "relationship" requirement. The broad
91. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
92. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2893, 2901 (1989).
93. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985); see also supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
94. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. X, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)
(repealed 1986). This statute provided that "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces crimi-
nal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of com-
mission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."
Id.
95. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2896.
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
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Dangerous Special Offender definition does nothing to narrow or clarify
the "pattern" concept.
With respect to the "continuity" requirement, the Court attempted
to provide guidance in defining the term "pattern." The Court's broad
explanation of the "continuity" requirement is that for a "pattern of
racketeering activity" to exist, the predicate offenses must "themselves
amount to, or . . . otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racke-
teering activity. ' 97 The Court then went on to explain this requirement,
establishing two categories of racketeering conduct that exhibit the re-
quired threat of continuity: "closed-ended" and "open-ended." 8 Ac-
cording to the majority opinion, "closed-ended" continuity can be
established "by proving a series of related predicates extending over a
substantial period of time."9 If the conduct did not continue over a
"substantial period of time," it still may be sufficiently continuous if it
can be shown to exhibit an "open-ended" threat of continuity-that is,
if it can be seen from the nature of the predicate acts themselves'"0 that
the activity is likely to continue, or if the acts are connected to the
operation of an ongoing criminal enterprise.10 1 The Court left open a
broad area for further clarification of the "continuity" concept, noting
that "the precise methods by which relatedness and continuity or its
threat may be proved, cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that
it will always be apparent whether in a particular case a 'pattern of
racketeering activity' exists."'1 2
The Court's discussion of "continuity" is somewhat troubling. It
seems at once to be too broad and too narrow, and does not address
some of the harder questions about the substance of the "pattern" con-
cept. Under the H.J. Inc. approach, it could be argued that any racke-
teering conduct occurring over a "substantial period of time"
constitutes a pattern. Thus, ten related mailings over a period of three
years in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud arguably could con-
stitute a RICO pattern. On the other hand, as Justice Antonin Scalia
noted in his concurrence, several distinct racketeering crimes commit-
ted over a very short period of time arguably could not be prosecuted
under the H.J. Inc. approach. 03
Thus, in the Department's view, the H.J. Inc. decision did not pro-
vide the guidance that the RICO bar eagerly had been awaiting. More-
97. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2901 (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 2902.
99. Id.
100. An example of such conduct is repeated extortion threats.
101. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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over, it contained one particularly troubling feature. In his concurring
opinion in H.J. Inc., Justice Scalia concluded:
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so
that issue is not before us. That the highest Court in the land has been unable to
derive from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for
the day when that challenge is presented. 10'
That observation, appearing under the endorsement of four Justices,
sent a shock wave through the RICO bar. Not surprisingly, the number
of constitutional attacks on RICO has increased dramatically. The De-
partment believes that RICO will survive these attacks, primarily be-
cause as a criminal statute it adequately notifies the defendant that the
repeated commission of criminal acts is unlawful.105 But the Court's un-
happiness with certain aspects of the statute, as expressed first in
Sedima and now in H.J. Inc., undoubtedly will add momentum to the
RICO reform movement.
While we defend RICO in the courts the Criminal Division has be-
gun to consider ways to redefine "pattern of racketeering activity" stat-
utorily. As RICO is now interpreted by the courts, two or more
predicate "acts" that are "related" and which reflect or threaten contin-
ued criminality constitute a "pattern." Nonetheless, that interpretation
contains its own ambiguities. It is not entirely certain what "related"
means.106 Furthermore, a sharp division arose in H.J. Inc. over the defi-
nition of "continuity." Five Justices appear to think the threat posed
by the defendants' criminal activities should "extend[] over a substan-
tial period of time."'01 7 Four Justices seem to doubt that a bright line
can ever be drawn distinguishing continuous from sporadic activity. 10 8
In fact, after H.J. Inc. all we know for certain is that a pattern of racke-
teering activity need not involve separate schemes, separate episodes,
multiple victims, or multiple participants. The task will be to improve
RICO by supplying some clarity to the pattern element, if possible,
104. Id. at 2909.
105. It is well settled that to pass constitutional muster a criminal statute need only afford
defendants fair notice that their contemplated conduct is criminal; they need not know that their
conduct violates a specific statute. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104-06 (1945);
United States v. Seregos, 655 F.2d 33, 36 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982);
United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977).
Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld a state RICO statute against a vagueness attack, noting that
because the obscenity predicate offenses at issue were not vague, the state RICO statute "cannot
be vague either." Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 925 (1989).
106. Acts are related if "they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that
renders them 'ordered' or 'arranged.'" H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900. This apparently means that a
pattern exists either if the acts are interrelated or are connected to the affairs of the same enter-
prise although not to each other.
107. See id. at 2902.
108. See id. at 2907-08.
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without unduly restricting its reach in areas where we still need it. 109
B. Department of Justice Policies for Interpreting and Applying
the Pattern Element
It is important to note that the controversy surrounding the "pat-
tern" element probably will not result in a significant step back in the
criminal or civil actions brought by federal prosecutors. The Depart-
ment's RICO approval guidelines,110 administered by the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section on behalf of the Criminal Division,
prohibit the bringing of RICO actions in inappropriate circumstances
and provide detailed guidance about the requirements for a RICO pat-
tern. Each proposed case is reviewed carefully by experienced attorneys
in Washington, D.C., and the final decision to permit RICO charges is
made at the level of Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and Racke-
teering Section or higher. Virtually all proposed indictments and com-
plaints are modified, often substantially, as a result of the review
process.
Although we are continuing to reevaluate our approval policies in
light of H.J. Inc., we have not yet instituted any changes in our view of
the "pattern" requirement. Our current test is labeled informally the
"single-episode test." We will not approve a RICO action unless each
act in the proposed pattern of racketeering activity arises from a crimi-
nal episode that is significantly distinct from the other conduct in the
pattern. Thus, for example, if a defendant mails five letters to an insur-
ance company in support of a single fraudulent claim for insurance,
those five mailings constitute one act of racketeering activity and can
be grouped together in the indictment. If, however, a defendant mails
letters to five different insurance companies, each of which insured the
109. Years ago, RICO was the only federal vehicle for reaching most mob murders and other
crimes of violence other than extortion and for exposing mobsters to long prison sentences for
otherwise bloodless crimes, such as fraud schemes that deplete businesses of assets. Consequently,
a broadly applied RICO statute was needed, for example, to cover three murders committed on the
same day.
The situation has changed considerably in recent years. The narcotics statutes in title 21 have
been strengthened so dramatically that RICO is almost never needed in pure narcotics prosecu-
tions. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988). Sections 1958 and 1959 of title 18 now deal directly with
contract murder and professional crimes of violence without requiring proof that the defendant
committed a pattern of (two or more) crimes. See id. §§ 1958-1959. The mail fraud and bank fraud
statutes now carry, in certain circumstances, 20-year jail terms and $1 million fines. See Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, supra note 61, § 961(i), (k), 103 Stat.
at 500 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1344). And, of course, several RICO predicate crimes
(such as loansharking and extortion) independently carry 20-year penalties. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-
894, 1951 (1988). As a practical matter, therefore, we do not use RICO in many cases where it
technically fits.
110. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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property that is the subject of the fraudulent claims, those five mailings
would constitute five acts of racketeering activity because there would
be five separate victims.
Obviously, the application of our "single-episode" test is not always
so clear cut. However, this nine year old test, under which more than
eight hundred RICO prosecutions have been approved, has been worka-
ble as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Unfortunately, this test does
nothing to control the use of RICO by private plaintiffs, who are not
required to submit their pleadings to us for review. Because of the un-
controlled resort to the civil RICO statute by private litigants, legisla-
tive action may result whether the government likes it or not.
VI. PROPOSED RICO REFORM LEGISLATION
At this writing, there are pending in Congress two nearly identical
civil RICO "reform" bills, designated as Senate Bill 438 and House Bill
1046.111 This legislation sharply would curtail private civil actions for
treble damages in most circumstances, while leaving government ac-
tions largely untouched. The bill, as currently drafted, would not
change the substantive provisions of RICO, including the definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity." In recognition of the adage "fore-
warned is forearmed," however, the Department is considering current
proposals to refocus RICO's "pattern" requirement, some of which, if
accompanied by a suitable explanatory discussion in the legislative his-
tory, might be acceptable to the Department of Justice. We have not, as
yet, concluded that one approach is superior to another, but I can pro-
vide some insight into the endeavor. For example, one definition that
we have considered is the following: "'Pattern of racketeering' means
two or more events of racketeering that present an actual or potential
threat of continuous racketeering over a substantial period of time, with
each event occurrgingwithin five years of another event in the pattern."
We believe this definition, in conjunction with appropriate analysis in
the legislative history, would codify our "single-episode" test, avoid
constitutional concerns, and clarify the statute while leaving it intact
for important government actions.
Other possible approaches, however, could serve as well. For exam-
ple, Professor G. Robert Blakey, a principal drafter of the original
RICO statute, has proposed the following as one possible approach:
"pattern of racketeering activity" means
(A) three or more acts of racketeering activity (excluding acts of jurisdictional sig-
111. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. On Nov. 16, 1989, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee was unable to accomplish the scheduled mark-up of S. 438, because of the lack of a
consensus.
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nificance only),
(B) the last act of racketeering activity occurred within five years of a prior act of
racketeering activity,
(C) the acts of racketeering activity were related to each other or to the affairs of
an enterprise,
(D) the acts of racketeering activity were part of a continuing series of acts of
racketeering.
For the purpose of this paragraph (C), acts of racketeering activity are related
if they have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods
of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and
are not isolated events.
For the purpose of paragraph (D), acts of racketeering activity are not part of a
continuing series if the acts of racketeering activity are so closely related to each
other and connected in point of time and place that the acts of racketeering consti-
tute a single episode so that in reference to the manner of their commission, the
purpose for which they were committed, the person who committed them, the en-
terprise in whose affairs they were committed, or otherwise, the acts of racketeering
do not give rise to an inference of the possibility of continuing acts of racketeering
activity. 112
We do not endorse either of these definitions or any other defini-
tion that has been proposed. We mention these two approaches only to
demonstrate that it is possible to correct the perceived deficiencies in
the current "pattern" definition through legislation. We will continue to
study these and other possible approaches in order to find one that best
clarifies the statute without unduly interfering with appropriate uses of
the RICO provisions.
VII. WHITE-COLLAR RICO PROSECUTIONS
Having addressed in detail the specific controversies currently sur-
rounding TROs, forfeiture of enterprise interests, and the "pattern" re-
quirement, I will conclude by addressing what is perhaps the
fundamental question underlying all of these controversies, at least in
the context of criminal prosecutions: Does the government have any
business using RICO to prosecute white-collar crime?' 13
The most obvious answer is that serious crime is serious crime, re-
gardless of the title on the defendant's door. The stealing of a million
dollars through a sophisticated securities fraud or mail fraud scheme is
just as harmful to society as the stealing of a similar amount by hi-
jacking interstate trucks. Fraudulent or otherwise criminal activity car-
ried on by legitimate businesses and their employees should be
prosecuted to the full extent of the laws enacted by Congress. As the
112. S. 438 Hearings, supra note 43 (testimony of Prof. G. Robert Blakey).
113. It should be noted that most, if not all, of the public controversy about our use of RICO
in "white-collar" cases has concerned cases involving securities or commodities fraud. Such cases
have constituted only about 2% of criminal RICO prosecutions approved by the Department of
Justice between 1984 and 1989.
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Supreme Court noted in H.J. Inc., "[l]egitimate businesses 'enjoy
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from
its consequences.' 11
Moreover, Congress clearly envisioned white-collar RICO prosecu-
tions when it included such offenses as mail fraud, wire fraud, and se-
curities fraud in the list of RICO predicates. Very recently, in the wake
of the savings and loan crisis, Congress added bank fraud115 to the list
of predicates.11 6
The fact that RICO properly encompasses many white-collar of-
fenses does not dispose of the issue. RICO is undeniably a very broad
statute with very severe penalties, including forfeiture. If the criminal
provisions were used in every case where they technically applied, we
could be criticized justifiably. The key to our use of RICO in prosecut-
ing white-collar crime is to confine the statute's use to those cases
where the unlawful conduct was both continuous and egregious and
where there is the prospect of significant forfeiture of ill-gotten pro-
ceeds or of interests in a tainted enterprise.
While we certainly recognize the necessity for restraint in our use
of RICO to prosecute white-collar crime, we continue to insist that
RICO is a valuable tool in the fight against such crime. In some cases
such as fraud schemes resulting in the failure of financial institutions,
RICO forfeiture may serve to return stolen assets to regulatory agencies
for the benefit of defrauded depositors." 7 In other cases, the use of
RICO may permit the government to include in the indictment as part
of the RICO "pattern" crimes for which the statute of limitations has
run and crimes committed in districts other than the district of venue.
Thus, the full extent of the defendant's conduct can be reflected in the
charging document, resulting in a fairer sentence.
Despite some apparent public perceptions, there is one thing the
government does not use RICO for: to coerce defendants into pleading
guilty. It is, of course, appropriate to advise a prospective defendant
that prosecutors are contemplating RICO charges. A defendant's knowl-
edge of that fact inevitably will figure in the decision whether to go to
trial or to plead guilty. Such an announcement to a defendant must
come, however, only in the regular course of plea negotiations, and only
when the prosecutors are in good faith planning to seek approval or
114. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
116. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, supra note
61, § 968, 103 Stat. at 506.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g)(4) (1988) provides for the restoration of forfeited property to vic-
tims and other innocent persons.
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have already obtained approval to present a RICO indictment to the
grand jury. The Criminal Division strictly enforces this distinction.
Prosecutors may not mention RICO charges solely as a weapon of in-
timidation to coerce a guilty plea.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is our philosophy that the more the public knows about our use
of RICO, the less the statute will be subjected to unfair attacks. That is
why our RICO guidelines and our procedures dealing with pretrial re-
straints and forfeitures are part of the public record. It is why in most
RICO cases, where flight to avoid prosecution is unlikely, it is our policy
to provide preindictment conferences to defense attorneys, and it is
why Criminal Division officials have testified so frequently before Con-
gress on the state of RICO use and misuse. With continued restraint by
the government and further clarification by the courts and Congress,
RICO can be expected to enjoy at least another two decades of vigorous
use.
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